Abstract. We propose a hybrid process calculus for modelling and reasoning on cyber-physical systems (CPSs). The dynamics of the calculus is expressed in terms of a labelled transition system in the SOS style of Plotkin. This is used to define a bisimulation-based behavioural semantics which support compositional reasonings. Finally, we prove run-time properties and system equalities for a non-trivial case study.
Introduction
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are integrations of networking and distributed computing systems with physical processes, where feedback loops allow physical processes to affect computations and vice versa. For example, in real-time control systems, a hierarchy of sensors, actuators and control processing components are connected to control stations. Different kinds of CPSs include supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA), programmable logic controllers (PLC) and distributed control systems.
The physical plant of a CPS is typically represented by means of a discrete-time state-space model 3 consisting of two equations of the form
where x k ∈ R n is the current (physical) state, u k ∈ R m is the input (i.e., the control actions implemented through actuators) and y k ∈ R p is the output (i.e., the measurements from the sensors). The uncertainty w k ∈ R n and the measurement error e k ∈ R p represent perturbation and sensor noise, respectively, and A, B, and C are matrices modelling the dynamics of the physical system. The next state x k+1 depends on the current state x k and the corresponding control actions u k , at the sampling instant k ∈ N. Note that, the state x k cannot be directly observed: only its measurements y k can be observed.
The physical plant is supported by a communication network through which the sensor measurements and actuator data are exchanged with the controller(s), i.e., the cyber component, also called logics, of a CPS (see Figure 1) . The range of CPSs applications is rapidly increasing and already covers several domains [10] : advanced automotive systems, energy conservation, environmental monitoring, avionics, critical infrastructure control (electric power, water resources, and communications systems for example), etc.
However, there is still a lack of research on the modelling and validation of CPSs through formal methodologies that might allow to model the interactions among the system components, and to verify the correctness of a CPS, as a whole, before its practical implementation. A straightforward utilisation of these techniques is for model-checking, i.e. to statically assess whether the current system deployment can guarantee the expected behaviour. However, they can also be an important aid for system planning, for instance to decide whether different deployments for a given application are behavioural equivalent.
In this paper, we propose a contribution in the area of formal methods for CPSs, by defining a hybrid process calculus, called CCPS, with a clearly-defined behavioural semantics for specifying and reasoning on CPSs. In CCPS, systems are represented as terms of the form E P , where E denotes the physical plant (also called environment) of the system, containing information on state variables, actuators, sensors, evolution law, etc., while P represents the cyber component of the system, i.e., the controller that governs sensor reading and actuator writing, as well as channel-based communication with other cyber components. Thus, channels are used for logical interactions between cyber components, whereas sensors and actuators make possible the interaction between cyber and physical components. Despite this conceptual similarity, messages transmitted via channels are "consumed" upon reception, whereas actuators' states (think of a valve) remains unchanged until its controller modifies it.
CCPS is equipped with a labelled transition semantics (LTS) in the SOS style of Plotkin [17] . We prove that our labelled transition semantics satisfies some standard time properties such as: time determinism, patience, maximal progress, and well-timedness. Based on our LTS, we define a natural notion of weak bisimilarity. As a main result, we prove that our bisimilarity is a congruence and it is hence suitable for compositional reasoning. We are not aware of similar results in the context of CPSs. Finally, we provide a non-trivial case study, taken from an engineering application, and use it to illustrate our definitions and our semantic theory for CPSs. Here, we wish to remark that while we have kept the example simple, it is actually far from trivial and designed to show that various CPSs can be modelled in this style.
Outline In § 2, we give syntax and operational semantics of CCPS. In § 3 we provide a bisimulation-based behavioural semantics for CCPS and prove its compositionality. In § 4 we model in CCPS our case study, and prove for it run-time properties as well as system equalities. In § 5, we discuss related and future work.
The Calculus
In this section, we introduce our Calculus of Cyber-Physical Systems CCPS. Let us start with some preliminary notations. We use x, x k ∈ X for state variables; c, d ∈ C for communication channels, a, a k ∈ A for actuator devices, s, s k ∈ S for sensors devices. Actuator names are metavariables for actuator devices like valve, light, etc. Similarly, sensor names are metavariables for sensor devices, e.g., a sensor thermometer that measures, with a given precision, a state variable called temperature. Values, ranged over by v, v ∈ V, are built from basic values, such as Booleans, integers and real numbers; they also include names.
Given a generic set of names N , we write R N to denote the set of functions assigning a real value to each name in N . For ξ ∈ R N , n ∈ N and v ∈ R, we write ξ[n → v] to denote the function ψ ∈ R N such that ψ(m) = ξ(m), for any m = n, and
N and a set of names M ⊆ N , we write ξ | M for the restriction of function ξ to the set M. In CCPS, a cyber-physical system consists of two components: a physical environment E that encloses all physical aspects of a system (state variables, physical devices, evolution law, etc) and a cyber component, represented as a concurrent process P that interacts with the physical devices (sensors and actuators) of the system, and can communicate, via channels, with other processes of the same CPS or with processes of other CPSs.
We write E P to denote the resulting CPS, and use M and N to range over CPSs. Let us formally define physical environments.
Definition 1 (Physical environment). LetX ⊆ X be a set of state variables, A ⊆ A be a set of actuators, andŜ ⊆ S be a set of sensors. A physical environment E is 7-tuple ξ x , ξ u , ξ w , evol , ξ e , meas, inv , where:
-ξ x ∈ RX is the state function, -ξ u ∈ RÂ is the actuator function, -ξ w ∈ RX is the uncertainty function,
RX is the evolution map, -ξ e ∈ RŜ is the sensor-error function, -meas : RX × RŜ → 2 RŜ is the measurement map, -inv : RX → {true, false} is the invariant function.
All the functions defining an environment are total functions.
The state function ξ x returns the current value (in R) associated to each state variable of the system. The actuator function ξ u returns the current value associated to each actuator. The uncertainty function ξ w returns the uncertainty associated to each state variable. Thus, given a state variable x ∈X , ξ w (x) returns the maximum distance between the real value of x and its representation in the model. Both the state function and the actuator function are supposed to change during the evolution of the system, whereas the uncertainty function is supposed to be constant.
Given a state function, an actuator function, and an uncertainty function, the evolution map evol returns the set of next admissible state functions. This function models the evolution law of the physical system, where changes made on actuators may reflect on state variables. Since we assume an uncertainty in our models, the evolution map does not return a single state function but a set of possible state functions. The evolution map is obviously monotone with respect to uncertainty: if ξ w ≤ ξ w then evol (ξ x , ξ u , ξ w ) ⊆ evol (ξ x , ξ u , ξ w ). Note also that, although the uncertainty function is constant, it can be used in the evolution map in an arbitrary way (e.g., it could have a heavier weight when a state variable reaches extreme values).
The sensor-error function ξ e returns the maximum error associated to each sensor inŜ. Again due to the presence of the sensor-error function, the measurement map meas, given the current state function, returns a set of admissible measurement functions rather than a single one.
Finally, the invariant function inv represents the conditions that the state variables must satisfy to allow for the evolution of the system. A CPS whose state variables don't satisfy the invariant is in deadlock.
Let us now formalise in CCPS the cyber components of CPSs. Our (logical) processes build on the timed process algebra TPL [9] (basically CCS enriched with a discrete notion of time). We extend TPL with two constructs: one to read values detected at sensors, and one to write values on actuators. The remaining processes of the calculus are the same as those of TPL.
Definition 2 (Processes).
Processes are defined by the grammar: P, Q ::= nil idle.P P Q π.P Q [b]{P }, {Q} P \c X rec X.P .
We write nil for the terminated process. The process idle.P sleeps for one time unit and then continues as P . We write P Q to denote the parallel composition of concurrent processes P and Q. The process π.P Q, with π ∈ {snd c v , rcv c(x), read s(x), write a v }, denotes prefixing with timeout. Thus, snd c v .P Q sends the value v on channel c and, after that, it continues as P ; otherwise, if no communication partner is available within one time unit, it evolves into Q. The process rcv c(x).P Q is the obvious counterpart for receiving. read s(x).P Q reads the value v detected by the sensor s and, after that, it continues as P , where x is replaced by v; otherwise, after one time unit, it evolves into Q. write a v .P Q writes the value v on the actuator a and, after that, it continues as P ; otherwise, after one time unit, it evolves into Q. The process P \c is the channel restriction operator of CCS. It is quantified over the set C of communication channels but we often use the shorthand P \C to mean P \c 1 \c 2 · · · \c n , for C = {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n }. The process [b]{P }, {Q} is the standard conditional, where b is a decidable guard. For simiplicity, as in CCS, we identify process [b]{P }, {Q} with P , if b evaluates to true, and [b]{P }, {Q} with Q, if b evaluates to false. In processes of the form idle.Q and π.P Q, the occurrence of Q is said to be time-guarded. The process rec X.P denotes time-guarded recursion as all occurrences of the process variable X may only occur time-guarded in P .
In the two constructs rcv c(x).P Q and read s(x).P Q, the variable x is said to be bound . Similarly, the process variable X is bound in rec X.P . This gives rise to the standard notions of free/bound (process) variables and α-conversion. We identify processes up to α-conversion (similarly, we identify CPSs up to renaming of state variables, sensor names, and actuator names). A term is closed if it does not contain free (process) variables, and we assume to always work with closed processes: the absence of free variables is preserved at run-time. As further notation, we write T { v / x } for the substitution of the variable x with the value v in any expression T of our language. Similarly, T { P / X } is the substitution of the process variable X with the process P in T .
The syntax of our CPSs is slightly too permissive as a process might use sensors and/or actuators which are not defined in the physical environment.
Definition 3 (Well-formedness). Given a process P and an environment E = ξ x , ξ u , ξ w , evol , ξ e , meas, inv , the CPS E P is well-formed if: (i) for any sensor s mentioned in P , the function ξ e is defined in s; (ii) for any actuator a mentioned in P , the function ξ u is defined in a.
Hereafter, we will always work with well-formed networks.
Finally, we assume a number of notational conventions. We write π.P instead of rec X. π.P X, when X does not occur in P . We write snd c (resp. rcv c) when channel c is used for pure synchronisation. For k ≥ 0, we write idle k .P as a shorthand for idle.idle. . . . idle.P , where the prefix idle appears k consecutive times. Given M = E P , we write M Q for E (P Q), and M \c for E P \c.
Labelled Transition Semantics
In this section, we provide the dynamics of CCPS in terms of a labelled transition system (LTS) in the SOS style of Plotkin. In Definition 4, for convenience, we define some auxiliary operators on environments.
The operator read sensor (E, s) returns the set of possible measurements detected by sensor s in the environment E; it returns a set of possible values rather than a single value due to the error ξ e (s) of sensor s. update act(E, a, v) returns the new environment in which the actuator function is updated in such a manner to associate the actuator a with the value v. next(E) returns the set of the next admissible environments reachable from E, by an application of the evolution map. inv (E) checks whether the state variables satisfy the invariant (here, with an abuse of notation, we overload the meaning of the function inv ).
In Table 1 , we provide transition rules for processes. Here, the meta-variable λ ranges over labels in the set {idle, τ, cv, cv, a!v, s?v}. Rules (Outp), (Inpp) and (Com) serve to model channel communication, on some channel c. Rules (Write) denotes the writing of some data v on an actuator a. Rule (Read) denotes the reading of some data v via a sensor s. Rule (Par) propagates untimed actions over parallel components. Rules (ChnRes) and (Rec) are the standard rules for channel restriction and recursion, respectively. The following four rules are standard, and model the passage of one time unit. The symmetric counterparts of rules (Com) and (Par) are obvious and thus omitted from the table.
In Table 2 , we lift the transition rules from processes to systems. All rules have a common premise inv (E): a CPS can evolve only if the invariant is satisfied, otherwise it is deadlocked. Here, actions, ranged over by α, are in the set {τ, cv, cv, idle}. These actions denote: non-observable activities (τ ); observable logical activities, i.e., channel transmission (cv and cv); the passage of time (idle). Rules (Out) and (Inp) model transmission and reception, with an external system, on a channel c. Rule (SensRead) models the reading of the current data detected at sensor s. Rule (ActWrite) models the writing of a value v on an actuator a. Rule (Tau) lifts non-observable actions from processes to systems. A similar lifting occurs in rule (Time) for timed actions, where next(E) returns the set of possible Now, having defined the actions that can be performed by a CPS, we can easily concatenate these actions to define execution traces. Formally, given a trace t = α 1 . . . α n , we will write t −− → as an abbreviation for
Below, we report a few desirable time properties which hold in our calculus: (a) time determinism, (b) maximal progress, (c) patience, and (d) well-timedness (symbol ≡ denotes standard structural congruence for timed processes [15, 14] ).
Theorem 5 (Time properties). Let
Well-timedness [14, 5] ensures the absence of infinite instantaneous traces which would prevent the passage of time, and hence the physical evolution of a CPS.
Bisimulation
Once defined the labelled transition semantics, we are ready to define our bisimulation-based behavioural equality for CPSs. We recall that the only observable activities in CCPS are: time passing and channel communication. As a consequence, the capability to observe physical events depends on the capability of the cyber components to recognise those events by acting on sensors and actuators, and then signalling them using (unrestricted) channels.
We adopt a standard notation for weak transitions: we write = ⇒ for the reflexive and transitive closure of τ -actions, namely ( A main result of the paper is that our bisimilarity can be used to compare CPSs in a compositional manner. In particular, our bisimilarity is preserved by parallel composition of (non-interfering) CPSs, by parallel composition of (non-interfering) processes, and by channel restriction.
Two CPSs do not interfere with each other if they have a disjoint physical plant.
e , meas i , inv i with sensors inŜ i , actuators in A i , and state variables inX i , for i ∈ {1, 2}. IfŜ 1 ∩Ŝ 2 = ∅ andÂ 1 ∩Â 2 = ∅ and X 1 ∩X 2 = ∅, then we define the disjoint union of the environments E 1 and E 2 , written E 1 E 2 , to be the environment ξ x , ξ u , ξ w , evol , ξ e , meas, inv such that:
e , and
) .
Definition 7 (Non-interfering CPSs). Let
. We say that M 1 and M 2 do not interfere with each other if E 1 and E 2 have disjoint sets of state variables, sensors and actuators. In this case, we write M 1 M 2 to denote the CPS defined as (E 1 E 2 ) (P 1 P 2 ).
A similar but simpler definition can be given for processes. Let M = E P , a non-interfering process Q is a process which does not interfere with the plant E as it never accesses its sensors and/or actuators. Thus, in the system M Q the process Q cannot interfere with the physical evolution of M . However, process Q can definitely affect the observable behaviour of the whole system by communicating on channels. Notice that, as we only consider well-formed CPSs (Definition 3), a non-interfering processes is basically a (pure) TPL process [9] . Definition 8 (Non-interfering processes). A process P is called non-interfering if it never acts on sensors and/or actuators. Now, everything is in place to prove the compositionality of our bisimilarity ≈.
Theorem 9 (Congruence results).
Let M and N be two CPSs.
The presence of invariants in the definition of physical environment makes the proof of the second item of the theorem above non standard.
As we will see in the next section, these compositional properties will be very useful when reasoning about complex systems.
Case study
In this section, we model in CCPS an engine, called Eng, whose temperature is maintained within a specific range by means of a cooling system. The physical environment Env of the engine is constituted by: (i) a state variable temp containing the current temperature of the engine; (ii) an actuator cool to turn on/off the cooling system; (iii) a sensor s t (such as a thermometer or a thermocouple) measuring the temperature of the engine; (iv) an uncertainty δ = 0.4 associated to the only variable temp; (v) a simple evolution law that increases (resp., decreases) the value of temp of one degree per time unit if the cooling system is inactive (resp., active) -the evolution law is obviously affected by the uncertainty δ; (vi) an error = 0.1 associated to the only sensor s t ; (vii) a measurement map to get the values detected by sensor s t , up to its error ; (viii) an invariant function saying that the system gets faulty when the temperature of the engine gets out of the range [0, 30] .
Formally, Env = ξ x , ξ u , ξ w , evol , ξ e , meas, inv with:
-ξ x ∈ R {temp} and ξ x (temp) = 0; -ξ u ∈ R {cool} and ξ u (cool ) = off; for the sake of simplicity, we can assume ξ u to be a mapping {cool } → {on, off} such that ξ u (cool ) = off if ξ u (cool ) ≥ 0, and
The cyber component of Eng consists of a process Ctrl which models the controller activity. Intuitively, process Ctrl senses the temperature of the engine at each time interval. When the sensed temperature is above 10, the controller activates the coolant. The cooling activity is maintained for 5 consecutive time units. After that time, if the temperature does not drop below 10 then the controller transmits its ID on a specific channel for signalling a warning, it keeps cooling for another 5 time units, and then checks again the sensed temperature; otherwise, if the sensed temperature is not above the threshold 10, the controller turns off the cooling and moves to the next time interval. Formally, The whole engine is defined as: Eng = Env Ctrl , where Env is the physical environment defined before. Our operational semantics allows us to formally prove a number of run-time properties of our engine. For instance, the following proposition says that our engine never reaches a warning state and never deadlocks. never reaches a warning state. Actually, we can be quite precise on the temperature reached by the engine before and after the cooling activity: in each of the 5 time slots of cooling, the temperature will drop of a value laying in the interval [1−δ, 1+δ], where δ is the uncertainty of the model. Formally, Proposition 11. For any execution trace of Eng, we have:
-when Eng turns on the cooling, the value of the state variable temp ranges over (10 − , 11 + + δ]; -when Eng turns off the cooling, the value of the variable temp ranges over (10 − − 5 * (1+δ) , 11 + + δ − 5 * (1−δ)].
In Figure 2 , the left graphic collects a campaign of 100 simulations, lasting 250 time units each, showing that the value of the state variable temp when the cooling system is turned on (resp., off) lays in the interval (9.9, 11.5] (resp., Now, the reader may wonder whether it is possible to design a variant of our engine which meets the same specifications with better performances. For instance, an engine consuming less coolant. Let us consider a variant of the engine described before: Here, Env is the same as Env except for the evolution map, as we set heat(ξ
This means that in Eng we reduce the power of the cooling system by 20%. In Figure 3 , we report the results of our simulations over 10000 runs lasting 10000 time units each. From this graph, Eng saves in average more than 10% of coolant with respect to Eng. So, the new question is: are these two engines behavioural equivalent? Do they meet the same specifications?
Our bisimilarity provides us with a precise answer to these questions.
Proposition 12.
The two variants of the engine are bisimilar: Eng ≈ Eng.
At this point, one may wonder whether it is possible to improve the performances of our engine even more. For instance, by reducing the power of the cooling system by a further 10%, by setting heat(ξ
We can formally prove that this is not the case. Finally, we show how we can use the compositionality of our behavioural semantics (Theorem 9) to deal with bigger CPSs. Suppose that Eng denotes the modelisation of an airplane engine. In this case, we could define in CCPS a very simple airplane control system that checks whether the left engine (Eng L ) and the right engine (Eng R ) are signalling warnings. The whole CPS is defined as follows: 
Intuitively, if one of the two engines is in a warning state then the process Check id i , for id ∈ {L, R}, checks whether also the second engine moves into a warning state, in the following 5 time intervals (i.e. during the cooling cycle). If both engines gets in a warning state then an alarm is sent, otherwise, if only one engine is facing a warning then the airplane control system yields a failure signalling which engine is not working properly.
So
Related and Future Work
A number of approaches have been proposed for modelling CPSs using formal methods. For instance, hybrid automata [1] combine finite state transition systems with discrete variables (whose values capture the state of the modelled discrete or cyber components) and continuous variables (whose values capture the state of the modelled continuous or physical components).
Hybrid process algebras [6] are a powerful tool for reasoning about physical systems and provide techniques for analysing and verifying protocols for hybrid automata. CCPS shares some similarities with the φ-calculus [18] , a hybrid extension of the π-calculus [15] . In the φ-calculus, a hybrid system is represented as a pair (E, P ), where E is the environment and P is the process interacting with the environment. Unlike CCPS, in φ-calculus, given a system (E, P ) the process P can dynamically change both the evolution law and the invariant of the system. However, the φ-calculus does not have a representation of physical devices and measurement law. Concerning behavioural semantics, the φ-calculus is equipped with a weak bisimilarity between systems that is not compositional.
In the HYPE process algebra [8] , the continuous part of the system is represented by appropriate variables whose changes are determined by active influences (i.e., commands on actuators). The authors defines a strong bisimulation that extends the ic-bisimulation of [3] . Unlike ic-bisimulation, the bisimulation in HYPE is preserved by a notion of parallel composition that is slightly more permessive than ours. However, bisimilar systems in HYPE must always have the same influence. Thus, in HYPE we cannot compare CPSs sending different commands on actuators at the same time, as we do in Proposition 12.
Vigo et al. [19] proposed a calculus for wireless-based cyber-physical systems endowed with a theory to study cryptographic primitives, together with explicit notions of communication failure and unwanted communication. The calculus does not provide any notion of behavioural equivalence. It also lacks a clear distinction between physical and logical components.
Lanese et al. [11] proposed an untimed calculus of mobile IoT devices interacting with the physical environment by means of sensors and actuators. The calculus does not allow any representation of the physical environment, and the bisimilarity is not preserved by parallel composition (compositionality is recovered by significantly strengthening the discriminating power).
Lanotte and Merro [12] extended and generalised the work of [11] in a timed setting by providing a bisimulation-based semantic theory that is suitable for compositional reasoning. As in [11] , the physical environment is not represented.
Bodei et al. [4] proposed an untimed process calculus supporting a control flow analysis to track how data spread from sensors to the logics of the network, and how physical data are manipulated. Sensors and actuators are modelled as value-passing CCS channels. The dynamics of the calculus is given in terms of a reduction relation and no behavioural equivalence is defined.
As regards future works, we believe that our paper can lay and streamline theoretical foundations for the development of formal and automated tools to verify CPSs before their practical implementation. To that end, we will consider applying, possibly after proper enhancements, existing tools and frameworks for automated verification, such as Maude [16] , Ariadne [2] , and SMC UPPAAL [7] , resorting to the development of an dedicated tool if existing ones prove not up to the task. Finally, in [13] , we developed an extended version of CCPS to provide a formal study of a variety of cyber-physical attacks targeting physical devices. Also in this case, the final goal is to develop formal and automated tools to analyse security properties of CPSs.
A Proofs
We recall that the cyber-components our CPSs are basically TPL-processes [9] extended with constructs to read sensors and write actuators. TPL already enjoys time determinism, patience and maximal progress. The well-timedness property is present in many process calculi with a discrete notion of time (e.g. [14] ) similar to ours. Thus, it is straightforward to rewrite the proofs of those results for our slight variant of TPL.
Proposition 15 (Processes time properties [9, 14] ).
The challenge in the proof of Theorem 5 is to lift the results of Proposition 15 to the CPSs of CCPS.
In its standard formulation, time determinism says that a system reaches at most one new state by executing a idle-action. However, by an application of Rule (Time), our CPSs may nondeterministically move into a new physical environment, according to the evolution law. Proof. Let M = E P . Since the only possible rule to derive idle −−− → is rule (Time), then we have that there is Q, R,Ê,Ẽ such that
The result follows by Proposition 15.
According to [9] , the maximal progress property says that processes communicate as soon as a possibility of communication arises. In our calculus, we generalise this property saying that τ -actions cannot be delayed, independently on how they are generated. 
Since M τ −− → and inv (E) = true and E ∈ next(E), for some E , the only possibility is P idle −−− → P for no P . Since P idle −−− → P for no P , by Proposition 15 we have that P τ −− → P . Since inv (E) = true, by an application of rule (Tau) there is N such that M In order to prove the compositionality or our bisimilarity, i.e. Theorem 9, we divide its statement in three different propositions.
In order to prove that ≈ preserves contextuality, we need a number of technical lemmas. Lemma 20 formalises a number of properties of the compound environment E 1 E 2 .
Lemma 20. Let E 1 and E 2 be two physical environments. If defined, the environment E 1 E 2 has the following properties:
1. read sensor (E 1 E 2 , s) is equal to read sensor (E 1 , s), if s is a sensor of E 1 , and it is equal to read sensor (E 2 , s), if s is a sensor of E 2 ; 2. v ∈ read sensor (E 1 , s) implies that v ∈ read sensor (E 1 E 2 , s) for any sensor s in E 1 and for any environment E 2 ; 3. update act (E 1 E 2 , a, v) is equal to update act(E 1 , a, v) E 2 , if a is an actuator of E 1 , and it is equal to E 1 update act(E 2 , a, v), if a is an actuator of E 2 ; 4. update act(E 1 , a, v) E 2 is equal to update act(E 1 E 2 , a, v) for any actuator a in E 1 and for any environment E 2 ;
Proof. By definition of the operator on physical environments.
Lemma 21 serves to propagate untimed actions on parallel CPSs.
Proof. The proof is by rule induction on why M α −− → M . Let us suppose that M = E 1 P 1 and O = E 2 P 2 , for some E 1 , E 2 , P 1 and P 2 . We can distinguish several cases on why M α −− → M . We prove the case in which M α −− → M is derived by an application of rule (SensRead). The other cases can be proved in a similar manner. In this case, we have α = τ and there are s, v, and P 1 such that
Since P 1 s?v −−− → P 1 , by an applicaiton of rule (Par) we can derive P 1 P 2 s?v −−− → P 1 P 2 . Since inv (E 1 ) = true and, by hypothesis, inv (E 2 ) = true, by an application of Lemma 20(6) we derive that inv (E 1 E 2 ) = true. Since v ∈ read sensor (E 1 , s), by an application of Lemma 20(2) we derive that v ∈ read sensor (E 1 E 2 , s). This is enough to derive that:
Hence the result follows by assuming M = E 1 P and M O = E 1 E 2 P 1 P 2 .
Next lemma says the invariants of bisimilar CPSs must agree. Here comes one of the main technical result: the bisimilarity is preserved by the parallel composition of non-interfering CPSs.
Proof. We show that the relation R = R 1 ∪ R 2 is a bisimulation where:
The relation R 2 is trivially a bisimulation because it contains pairs of deadlocked CPSs. Thus, we focus on when (M O, N O) ∈ R 1 .
We proceed by case analysis on why
-Let M O τ −− →M , with M = E 1 P 1 and O = E 2 P 2 , for some E 1 , E 2 , P 1 and P 2 , by an application of rule (SensRead). This implies that
We recall that by definition of the environments E 1 and E 2 have different physical devices. Thus, there are two cases:
• s is a sensor of E 1 . In this case, P 1 s?v −−− → P 1 , for some P 1 , and hence P = P 1 P 2 . Since inv (E 1 E 2 ) = true and v ∈ read sensor (E 1 E 2 , s), by an application of Lemma 20 (1) and Lemma 20(6), we derive inv (E 1 ) = inv (E 2 ) = true and v ∈ read sensor (E 1 , s). Now, let M = E 1 P 1 ; it follows thatM = M O. Since P 1
• s is a sensor of E 2 .
In this case, P 2 s?v −−− → P 2 , for some P 2 , and hence 2 , s) , by an application of Lemma 20 (1) and Lemma 20(6), we derive inv (E 1 ) = inv (E 2 ) = true and v ∈ read sensor (E 2 , s). As M ≈ N , by Lemma 22 it follows that inv (E 3 ) = true, and hence inv (E 3 E 2 ) = true. Since v ∈ read sensor (E 2 , s), by Lemma 20(2), it follows that v ∈ read sensor (E 3 E 2 , s).
, with M = E 1 P 1 and O = E 2 P 2 , for some E 1 , E 2 , P 1 and P 2 , by an application of rule (ActWrite). This case is similar to the previous ones. Basically we apply Lemma 20(3) instead of Lemma 20(1), and Lemma 20(4) instead of Lemma 20 (2) .
, with M = E 1 P 1 and O = E 2 P 2 , for some E 1 , E 2 , P 1 and P 2 , by an application of rule (Tau):
We can distinguish four cases.
• Let P 1 P 2 τ −− → P by an application of rule (Par), because P 1 τ −− → P 1 and P = P 1 P 2 , for some P 1 . Since inv (E 1 E 2 ), by Lemma 20(6), inv (E 1 ) = inv (E 2 ) = true. Let M = E 1 P 1 ; we have thatM = M O. • Let P 1 P 2 τ −− → P by an application of rule (Par), because P 2 τ −− → P 2 and P = P 1 P 2 , for some P 2 . Let O = E 2 P 2 ; it follows that M = M O = E 1 E 2 (P 1 P 2 ). Let N = E 3 P 3 , for some E 3 and P 3 . By an application of rule (Par) we have that P 3 P 2 τ −− → P 3 P 2 . Since inv (E 1 E 2 ), by an application of Lemma 20(6), we derive inv (E 1 ) = inv (E 2 ) = true. As M ≈ N , by Lemma 22 it follows that inv (E 3 ) = true, and hence inv (E 3 E 2 ) = true. Summarising P 3 P 2 τ −− → P 3 P 2 and inv (E 3 E 2 ) = true. Thus, by an application of rule (Tau) 
• Let P 1 P 2 τ −− → P by an application of rule (Com) because P 1 cv −−− → P 1 and P 2 cv −−− → P 2 and P = P 1 P 2 , for some P 1 and P 2 . Since inv (E 1 E 2 ) = true, by Lemma 20 (6) follows that inv (E 1 ) = inv (E 2 ) = true. Let M = E 1 P 1 and O = E 2 P 2 ; we have thatM = M O .
Since P 1 cv −−− → P 1 and inv (E 1 ) = true, by an application of rule (Out) we have M −−− → P 3 for some P 3 and P 3 and E 3 such that N 1 = E 3 P 3 and N 2 = E 3 P 3 and inv (E 3 ) = true. Since P 2 cv −−− → P 2 we can use rules (Com) to derive P 2 P 3 τ −− → P 2 P 3 . Moreover from the fact that both inv (E 2 ) = true and inv (E 3 ) = true we can derive, by Lemma 20 (6) , that inv (E 3 E 2 ) = true. Summarising P 2 P 3 τ −− → P 2 P 3 and inv (E 3 E 2 ) = true, and, for O = E 2 P 2 and O = E 2 P 2 , we can use rule (Tau) to derive
by an appropriate number of applications of Lemma 21, we get
and P 2 cv −−− → P 2 , for some P 1 and P 2 . This case is similar to the previous one.
-Let M O idle −−− →M , with M = E 1 P 1 and O = E 2 P 2 , for some E 1 , E 2 , P 1 and P 2 . This action can be derived only by an application of rule (Time):
The derivation P 1 P 2 idle −−− → P follows by an application of rule (TimePar) because P 1 idle −−− → P 1 and P 2 idle −−− → P 2 , for some P 1 and P 2 , such that P = P 1 P 2 . Since inv (E 1 E 2 ), by Lemma 20 (6) follows that inv (E 1 ) = inv (E 2 ) = true. Since E ∈ next(E 1 E 2 ), by Lemma 20(5) follows that E = E 1 E 2 , for some E 1 ∈ next(E 1 ) and E 2 ∈ next(E 1 ). Similarly, from P 2 • The invariant of O is true. In this case, by an appropriate number of applications of Lemma 21 we get
• The invariant of O is false.
In this case, we have that
E , P 1 , P 2 and P . This derivation can be only due to an application of rule (Inp):
We distinguish two cases.
• P 1 cv −−− → P 1 , for some P 1 such that P = P 1 P 2 . Then, let M = E 1 P 1 ; we have thatM = M O. Since inv (E 1 E 2 ), by Lemma 20(6) , it follows that inv (E 1 ) = inv (E 2 ) = true. Since P 1 cv −−− → P 1 and inv (E 1 ) = true, by an application of (Inp) on M we can derive
by Lemma 20(6) it follows that inv (E 2 ) = true. Let N = E 3 P 3 , for some E 3 and P 3 . Since M ≈ N and inv (E 2 ) = true, by Lemma 22 we derive inv (E 3 ) = true. By Lemma 20 (6) it follows that that inv (E 3 E 2 ) = true. Furthermore, by an application of rule (Par) we have P 3 P 2 cv −−− → P 3 P 2 . Summarising: P 3 P 2 cv −−− → P 3 P 2 and inv (E 3 E 2 ) = true. Thus, by an application of rule (Inp) 
This case is similar to the previous one. Now, let us prove the our bisimilarity is preserved by parallel composition of non-interfering processes. This is a special case of the previous result.
Proposition 24. M ≈ N implies M P ≈ N P , for any non-interfering process P .
Proof. We have to prove that M ≈ N implies M P ≈ N P , for any process P which does not access any physical device.
Let E ∅ be the environment with an empty set of state variables, sensors and actuators. It is straightforward to prove that M P ≈ M (E ∅ P ) and N P ≈ N (E ∅ P ). Since ≈ is preserved by the operator , the result follows by transitivity of ≈.
Finally, we prove that bisimilarity is preserved by channel restriction. 
Proof of Theorem 9
Proof. By Proposition 23, Proposition 24 and Proposition 25.
In order to prove Proposition 10 and Proposition 11 we use the following lemma that formalises the invariant properties binding the state variable temp with the activity of the cooling system.
Intuitively, when the cooling system is inactive the value of the state variable temp lays in the interval [0, 11 + + δ]. Furthermore, if the coolant is not active and the variable temp lays in the interval (10 + , 11 + + δ] then the cooling will be turned on in the next time slot. Finally, when active then cooling system will remain so for k ∈ 1..5 time slots (counting also the current time slot) being the variable temp in the real interval (10 − − k * (1+δ), 11 + + δ − k * (1−δ)].
Lemma 26. Let Eng be the system defined in § 4. Let
such that the traces t j contain no idle-actions, for any j ∈ 1..n−1, and for any i ∈ 1..n Eng i = E i P i with E i = ξ Proof. Let us denote with v i the values of the state variable temp in the systems Eng i , i.e., ξ i x (temp) = v i . Moreover we will say that the coolant is active (resp., is not active) in
The proof is by mathematical induction on n, i.e., the number idle-actions of our traces.
The case base n = 1 follows directly from the definition of Eng. Let prove the inductive case. We assume that the three statements holds for n − 1 and we prove that they also hold for n.
In this case k = 1 as the coolant is not active in Eng n−1 and it is active in Eng n . Since k = 1, we have to prove v n ∈ (10− −(1+δ), 11+ +δ−(1−δ)]. However, since the coolant is not active in Eng n−1 and is active in Eng n it means that the coolant has been switched on in Eng n−1 because the sensed temperature was above 10 (this may happen only if v n−1 > 10 − ). By inductive hypothesis, since the coolant is not active in Eng n−1 , we have that v n−1 ∈ [0, 11 + + δ]. Therefore, from v n−1 > 10 − and v n−1 ∈ [0, 11+ +δ] it follows that v n−1 ∈ (10− , 11+ +δ]. Furthermore, since the coolant is active in Eng n , the temperature will decrease of a value in [1−δ, 1+δ] and therefore v n ∈ (10− −(1+δ), 11+ +δ −(1−δ)] which concludes this case of the proof.
-Suppose the coolant is active in Eng n−1 (and active in Eng n as well).
By inductive hypothesis there is h ∈ 1..5 such that v n−1 ∈ (10 − − h * Hence it must be h ∈ 1..4. Let us prove that for k = h + 1 we obtain our result. Namely we have to prove that, for
, and (ii) the coolant is not active in Eng n−k and active in Eng n−k +1 , . . . , Eng n . Let us prove the statement (i). By inductive hypotheses, it holds that v n−1 ∈ (10 − − h * (1 + δ), 11 + + δ − h * (1 − δ)]. Since the coolant is active in Eng n then the temperature will decrease Hence, v n ∈ (10 − − (h + 1) * (1 + δ), 11 + + δ − (h + 1) * (1 − δ)]. Therefore, since k = h + 1, we have that v n ∈ (10 − − k * (1 + δ), 11 + + δ − k * (1 − δ)]. Let us prove the statement (ii). By inductive hypothesis the coolant is inactive in Eng n−1 −h and it is active in Eng n−h , . . . , Eng n−1 . Now, since the coolant is active in Eng n , for k = h+1, we have that the coolant is not active in Eng n−k and is active in Eng n−k +1 , . . . , Eng n which concludes this case of the proof.
Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. By Lemma 26 and since δ = 0.4 and = 0.1, the value of the state variable temp is always in the real interval [0, 11.5]. As a consequence, the invariant of the system is never violated and the system never deadlocks. Moreover, after 5 idle -actions of cooling the state variable temp is always in the real interval (10 − 0.1 − 5 * 1.4, 11 + 0.1 + 0.4 − 5 * 0.6] = (2.9, 8.5]. Hence the process Ctrl will never transmit on the channel warning.
Proof of Proposition 11
Proof. Let us prove the two statements separately.
-If process Ctrl senses a temperature above 10 (and hence Eng turns on the cooling) then the value of the state variable temp is greater than 10 − . By Lemma 26 the value of the state variable temp is always less or equal than 11 + + δ. Therefore, if Ctrl senses a temperature above 10, then the value of the state variable temp is in (10 − , 11 + + δ]. -By Lemma 26 (third item) the coolant can be active for no more than 5 time slots. Hence, by Lemma 26, when Eng turns off the cooling system the state variable temp ranges over (10 − − 5 * (1 + δ), 11 + + δ − 5 * (1 − δ)].
In order to prove Proposition 12 we use the following lemma that is a variant of Lemma 26. Differently from Lemma 26, when active then cooling system will remain so for k ∈ 1..5 time slots (counting also the current time slot) being the variable temp in the real interval (10 − − k * (0.8+δ), 11.5 − k * (0.8−δ)].
Lemma 27. Let Eng be the system defined in § 4. Let Eng = Eng1 Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 26.
Proof of Proposition 12
Proof. By Proposition 10 is sufficient to prove that Eng has no trace which deadlocks or emits an alarm.
By Lemma 27 and since δ = 0.4 and = 0.1, the value of the state variable temp is always in the real interval [0, 11.5]. As a consequence, the invariant of the system is never violated and the system never deadlocks. Moreover, after 5 idle -actions of cooling the state variable temp is always in the real interval (10 − 0.1 − 5 * 1.2, 11 + 0.1 + 0.4 − 5 * 0.4] = (3.9, 9.5]. Hence the process Ctrl will never transmit on the channel warning.
Proof of Proposition 13
Proof. It is is enough to prove that there exists an execution trace of the engine Eng containing an output along channel warning. Then the result follows by an application of Proposition 10.
We can easily build up a trace for Eng in which, after 10 idle-actions, in the 11-th time slot, the value of the state variable temp is 10.1. In fact, it is enough to increase the temperature of 1.01 degrees for the first 10 rounds. Notice that this is an admissible value since, 1.01 ∈ [1 − δ, 1 + δ] = [0.6, 1.4]. Being 10.1 the value of the state variable temp, there is an execution trace in which the sensed temperature is 10 (recall that = 0.1) and hence the cooling system is not activated. However, in the following time slot, i.e. the 12-th time slot, the temperature may reach at most the value 10.1 + 1 + δ = 11.5, imposing the activation of the cooling system. After 5 time units of cooling, in the 17-th time slot, the variable temp will be at most 11.5 − 5 * (0.7 − δ) = 11.5 − 1.5 = 10. Since = 0.1, the sensed temperature would be in the real interval [9.9, 10.1]. Thus, there is an execution trace in which the sensed temperature is 10.1, which will be greater than 10. As a consequence, the warning will be emitted, in the 17-th time slot.
Proof of Proposition 14
Proof. By Proposition 12 we derive Eng ≈ Eng. By simple α-conversion it follows that Eng L ≈ Eng L and Eng R ≈ Eng R , respectively. By Theorem 9(1) (and transitivity of ≈) it follows that Eng L Eng R ≈ Eng L Eng R . By Theorem 9(2) it follows that (Eng L Eng R ) Check ≈ (Eng L Eng R ) Check . By Theorem 9(3) we obtain Airplane ≈ Airplane.
